

Industry-led Electricity Contract Co-Design Consultation Feedback Summary

October 2026

Executive Summary

ASL, on behalf of the Electricity Contract Co-Design Working Group, sought targeted feedback from industry on draft contract structures for bulk energy, shaping and firming services in September 2026.


42 submissions were received from a diverse range of stakeholders across the energy sector, including project developers, independent power producers, gentailers, retailers, investors, large energy users, industry associations, technology providers, traders/intermediaries, demand response providers, community and consumer advocacy organisations, and policy and research bodies. The feedback reflected a broad range of perspectives on the proposed contract suite, with respondents providing input on bulk energy, shaping and firming products, as well as broader considerations relating to bankability, risk allocation, buyer value, market liquidity and future market development.

Table 1 provides a summary of key findings from the consultation, with stakeholder sentiment broadly towards the draft contract structures captured in Figure 1.

Table 1 - Consultation Key Findings

Areas of generally strong stakeholder consensus	• General support for the RRPPA (Regional Reference PPA) and cap contract structures. • The need for negative pricing provisions within the RRPPA for bankability. • Force Majeure provisions should not be managed through the ESEM contracts but require a mechanism for bankability. • General support for weekly financial settlement of contracts.
Key Areas of Divergence	• The value of a RRPPA price cap and strike price of the cap contract. • Whether a price floor or volume knock out in the RRPPA is the most efficient mechanism to manage negative price intervals. • The proposed dynamic block setting approach underpinning the spread swap.
Unresolved issues for further consideration	• Management of Force Majeure risks. • Hybrid projects and emerging technology eligibility and participation. • RRPPA Reference Fleet participation rules and governance. • Charge/discharge block setting approach design and governance.

Figure 1: Stakeholder responses to Q12: Do the proposed contract structures achieve the Working Group's Terms of Reference and perform well against the identified evaluation criteria? (n=18 responses to Q12 from 42 submissions)



Overview

This document summarises the key themes of feedback received during consultation on the preferred contract structures identified by the Electricity Contract Co-Design Working Group (WG) in September 2026.

Identified preferred contract structures

The WG sought targeted feedback from industry related to the following three contract structures:

Bulk Energy

Regional Reference PPA (RRPPA)

A swap based on the dispatched volume and price of the regional Reference Fleet that provides buyers with a hedge based on a regional technology (e.g. wind or solar) shape and renewable sellers with long-term price certainty.

Shaping

Dynamic Time of Day Block Spread Swap

A dynamically set swap that contracts the difference between daily low-price charge periods and high-price discharge periods (determined by day-ahead residual demand), providing buyers with a hedge against intra-day volatility and sellers with long-term revenue certainty.

Firming

\$600 Cap Contract

A cap with a \$600 strike price that provides buyers with insurance against high-priced events and sellers with long-term, stable cash-flows and ability to retain some merchant revenues under the cap.

Consultation process

The WG sought feedback from industry via a consultation paper and draft product sheets containing key terms, a summary of risk allocations and settlement examples. Over the three-week consultation period, the WG also provided briefings to a range of market participants and industry bodies. The WG requested written feedback through an online portal comprising 14 consultation questions.

A total of 42 submissions were received from a diverse range of stakeholders across the energy sector, including project developers, independent power producers, gentailers, retailers, investors, large energy users, industry associations, technology providers, traders/intermediaries, demand response providers, community and consumer advocacy organisations, and policy and research bodies. A majority of responses received were from natural sellers of the products, reflecting the broad range of market participants involved in the development and operation of assets across bulk energy, shaping and firming. The WG acknowledged this when considering quantitative summaries of feedback received and where possible, both buyer and seller perspectives have been summarised.

The feedback reflected a broad range of perspectives on the proposed contract suite, with respondents providing input on bulk energy, shaping and firming products, as well as broader considerations relating to bankability, risk allocation, buyer value, market liquidity and future market development.

Regional Reference PPA

Overview: Stakeholders generally supported the proposed RRPPA for wind and solar, however, requested further detail on index design and clarity on whether the product was intended for hybrid projects and offshore wind. Stakeholders strongly supported the inclusion of a negative pricing regime, however, were divided on whether a price floor (generally the preference of sellers) or volume knock-out (generally the preference of buyers) was the most suitable mechanism. Sellers strongly supported that a price cap was required for bankability, whilst buyers were concerned about the reduction in the value of the product.

Suitability for a range of bulk energy technologies

Stakeholders broadly supported the proposed Regional Reference PPA and considered it suitable for wind and solar generation projects. Many respondents viewed the index-based approach as a significant improvement on previous fixed-volume contract designs, noting that it reduces project-specific volume risk while supporting fungibility, tradability and buyer value through exposure to a diversified regional generation profile.

Several sellers raised concerns regarding potential basis risk, particularly where a project's production profile may differ from the broader regional fleet, although it was noted that the price cap materially reduces tail risks. Some buyers questioned long-term contract value and whether the product would provide sufficient value relative to existing market arrangements.

Questions were raised regarding the treatment of hybrid projects and emerging technologies (such as offshore wind), with many submissions seeking greater clarity on how these technologies would participate within the proposed framework.

Cap on spot price exposure

Stakeholder feedback regarding the inclusion of a price cap diverged between buyers (who were generally against) and sellers (who were generally in favour).

Sellers, who were generally in favour of a cap, noted that an uncapped RRPPA could expose sellers to liabilities up to the Market Price Cap, when an individual project underperforms the Reference Fleet during a high-price interval. Stakeholders noted that this exposure is difficult to quantify, hedge and finance over a long contract tenor. Several submissions considered alignment between the bulk energy product cap and the firming product strike price to be logical, as it supports the ability to stack products and create a more complete and more efficient hedging package.

Opposition was concentrated among buyer-side stakeholders and some gentailers. These respondents generally did not dispute that sellers could face material high-price exposure and instead their concern was that the proposed solution automatically transfers that risk to the buyer of the product.

Many respondents expressed a preference for a \$600/MWh cap over a \$300/MWh cap. Supporters considered a higher cap to provide greater buyer value, preserve more merchant upside for sellers and better support investment in new generation and firming assets. Several stakeholders also noted that a \$600 cap aligns with the proposed strike price of the cap for firming and with the current Administrative Price Cap, and may better reflect future market conditions.

AFMA *"The Regional Reference PPA (RRPPA) removes much of the complexity of the previously discussed dispatch weighted average swap and better allocates risk to the parties able to bear it."*

Tilt Renewables *"Tilt Renewables supports the RRPPA as the preferred bulk energy contract for wind generation and agrees that technology-specific reference fleets are likely to provide a more effective hedge than alternative."*

Origin Energy *"... aligning the cap on spot price exposure under the reference PPA with the strike price of the firming product would help manage risk for both sellers and buyers."*

EUAA *"While the proposed cap may support project bankability, it removes part of the price protection otherwise provided by the swap, and transfers residual price risk to buyers."*

AGL *"A cap should only be included if it is shown to be necessary to make the RRPPA bankable and the resulting reduction in tender prices justifies the loss of buyer value."*

Negative pricing provision

Stakeholders broadly agreed that the increasing occurrences of negative pricing in the NEM warrant a mechanism to manage settlement outcomes during these periods and to maintain efficient dispatch incentives for market participants. Stakeholders noted that both price floors and volume knock-outs are used in market today and stakeholders framed the design choice as a trade-off between financing outcomes and market efficiency. Generally, but not exhaustively, sellers were in favour of a price floor and buyers were in favour of a volume knock-out provision.

Supporters of a price floor argued that it would provide sellers with greater revenue certainty and more predictable cashflows, support project bankability, allow more efficiently priced bids and potentially reduce financing costs. Some stakeholders considered a \$0 floor to be more consistent with existing government-supported contracting arrangements and commercial market practice. Stakeholders supporting a volume knock out argued it better preserved market signals and was fairer for buyers.

A recurring theme across submissions was the interaction between the negative price mechanism and the Reference Production Index. Several respondents highlighted the potential for settlement design to influence generator behaviour during negative price periods, which could in turn affect the representativeness and stability of the reference fleet. Various alternative approaches were suggested, including using unconstrained generation measures or other methodologies to preserve index integrity while maintaining efficient dispatch incentives.

Reference Production Index

Many stakeholders expressed support for the proposed Reference Production Index (RPI) and considered it a reasonable approach to balancing seller basis risk and buyer value. Respondents generally agreed that an index based on the output of a reference fleet could provide a more fungible and tradable product while reducing buyers' exposure to the performance of individual projects. Several stakeholders also considered the approach preferable to previous contract designs that relied on fixed volume obligations.

While several respondents considered the proposed risk allocation was appropriately balanced, others argued the design may favour buyers by exposing sellers to basis risk that cannot be fully managed or hedged. Several stakeholders noted that these risks may be particularly significant for projects with generation profiles that differ from the broader regional fleet.

Many stakeholders noted that confidence in the index will depend on participants being able to understand, model and forecast its performance over time. Respondents highlighted the need for clear rules regarding fleet composition, project eligibility, annual updates, contribution caps and the treatment of new and retiring assets

Stakeholders also raised questions regarding the treatment of specific technologies and project types. Several submissions supported separate reference fleets for wind and solar and highlighted the need for further consideration of hybrids, emerging technologies (such as offshore wind) and regions with limited fleet depth (such as solar in Tasmania).

Clean Energy Investor Group *"Our preference is for a \$0 price floor. Both options protect buyers from the disproportionate payments that would otherwise arise during negative price periods, so the choice between them largely comes down to how the remaining value is shared."*

BlueScope Steel *"A negative price provision is appropriate as it will incentivise efficient dispatch. We do not have a strong preference... however the \$0 price floor may be simpler to apply as it preserves the Reference Fleet volume profile."*

Acciona *"Although sellers retain basis risk, this is to a more correlated reference index rather than to firm volumes. On the buyer side, the current design enables buyers to purchase a slice of wind or solar generation in a particular region while not being exposed to the physical dispatch risks associated with any one individual project."*

Shell Energy *"The methodology should be transparent, reproducible and stable, with prospective governance for fleet changes, outages, constraints, curtailment, marginal loss factors, negative prices and data revisions."*

Dynamic Time of Day Block Spread Swap

Overview: Stakeholders generally supported the proposed spread-swap structure for shaping services; however, views differed regarding the dynamic block setting methodology. Some stakeholders were concerned that the dynamic block setting approach did not provide sufficient coverage for buyers who may value certainty of when the hedge applied more highly than optimising for capturing daily (price) spreads. Some stakeholders noted the complimentary nature of the shaping product and the RRPPA, given block setting using residual demand provides buyers with a hedge during periods of low renewable generation. Stakeholders noted that the value of the product was dependent on residual demand remaining an effective way to forecast price in a system with high penetration of renewables.

Residual demand as a method to determine charge/discharge periods

Stakeholders provided a range of responses to the proposed approach to use residual demand to forecast high and low-price periods on a day ahead basis.

Sellers were generally favourable about the proposed approach and considered that the dynamic determination of charge and discharge periods was considered likely to capture more than value than fixed time blocks over the life of the contract.

However, some stakeholders raised concerns regarding whether residual demand will continue to be a reliable indicator of price outcomes as storage penetration increases, generation technologies diversify and patterns of supply and demand change over time. Several submissions noted that future market conditions may differ materially from those observed today. Feedback also highlighted the need to accommodate different storage technologies and operating characteristics. Several submissions suggested considering different product durations or variants to support participation while maintaining standardisation and liquidity.

Underlying forecast data

Feedback on the use of AEMO forecast data was generally supportive, with respondents recognising the value of using an independent, transparent and publicly available data source. The approach was seen as providing a common reference point for determining shaping periods and supporting consistency across market participants.

Stakeholders reinforced that the value of the product was dependent on the relationship between forecast outcomes and realised market prices. Feedback highlighted the risk that shaping periods determined using forecast data may not align with actual high- and low-price intervals, potentially reducing the value of the product for buyers and creating additional basis risk for sellers. A number of submissions called for ongoing monitoring and testing of forecast performance to ensure the methodology remains effective.

The governance of forecast methodologies was another common area of feedback. Participants noted that changes to AEMO forecasting processes, datasets or underlying methodologies over the life of a contract could materially alter financial outcomes. Many submissions supported the establishment of clear governance arrangements, consultation processes and change management frameworks to provide confidence that future adjustments will be transparent and predictable.

AGL *"Setting the charge and discharge periods in advance makes the contract easier for sellers to manage and finance, but leaves buyers with the risk that the periods nominated on the preceding day will not correspond with the actual low and high-price intervals."*

Akaysha Energy *"...in our view this approach provides the most appropriate balance between operational risks and long-term value."*

BlueScope Steel *"The dynamic residual-demand approach appears reasonable and should provide a more adaptable hedge than fixed time blocks as market conditions change."*

Nectr *"AEMO revises its forecasting systems and demand definitions over time, such as the treatment of storage, scheduled loads and "operational demand" itself. A 10+ year contract needs change-management provisions that preserve the economic intent."*

Day ahead nomination approach

The proposed day-ahead determination process was generally seen as providing sufficient advance notice for operational planning and risk management. Participants noted that advance visibility of charge and discharge periods would support project financing, operational decision-making and commercial risk management, while maintaining a relatively simple and standardised product design.

While many respondents supported the certainty provided by day-ahead nominations, some questioned whether a shorter nomination timeframe or a limited re-nomination opportunity could improve alignment between nominated periods and realised market conditions without introducing significant complexity. Some buyers with fixed daily loads noted that a day-ahead approach may not align with their operational requirements.

Questions were raised about whether 4pm was the most appropriate time for nominations to be made, given that there would be over 24 hours between nomination and the day-ahead peak. This time period was viewed to pose a risk that outages, constraints or other market conditions cause the forecast to alter significantly between nomination and dispatch.

Shaping period start/end time

Feedback also identified potential challenges associated with the chosen 09:05 to 09:00 boundary. Some participants observed that the proposed Daily Shaping Period differs from existing NEM trading day conventions and settlement boundaries, which may create additional complexity for contract administration, settlement processes and portfolio management. Suggestions were made to consider alignment with existing market conventions where possible.

A recurring theme in the feedback was the interaction between the Daily Shaping Period and the physical operating characteristics of storage assets. Several submissions highlighted the importance of ensuring that nominated charge and discharge periods remain physically achievable and do not inadvertently create operational constraints

The relationship between the Daily Shaping Period and forecast horizons was another area of discussion. Several submissions noted that the effectiveness of the daily period should be considered alongside nomination timing and forecast methodologies, as these elements collectively influence product outcomes and operational practicality.

CEIG *“As periods would be set for all contracts under a standardised methodology rather than nominated by individual participants, sellers can plan around them and continue to rebid to optimise their dispatch within and around the nominated periods.”*

Clean Energy Council *“A 4pm day-ahead determination provides roughly 17 hours of notice before the shaping day commences at 09:05, which is ample for battery state-of-charge planning.”*

AGL *“Weather, demand and renewable output can change materially after nominations are set at 4 pm. The nominated charge and discharge periods may therefore miss the low- and high-price periods that emerge the following day.”*

Engie ANZ *“The proposed 09:05 to 09:00 Daily Shaping Period may be operationally workable as it aligns the start of the contract day with likely solar charging conditions. However, it is less familiar than other options and may complicate reconciliation with other hedge products, internal risk systems and daily reporting.”*

\$600 Cap

Overview: Stakeholders were supportive of the cap contract structure for the firming service. However, buyer and seller views diverged on the strike price. Buyers shared some concerns about the value of the proposed \$600 cap, given the exposures beyond the common \$300 cap traded today. Sellers generally supported the \$600 cap, noting alignment with the Administrative Pricing Cap (APC) and rising marginal running costs that could result in limited or no operating margin at \$300/MWh. Some sellers noted that the \$600 cap may not incentivise technologies that can deliver energy continuously for over 8 hours.

Strike price

Sellers were generally supportive of a \$600/MWh cap and considered it a more suitable product for supporting investment in new firming assets, whilst some buyers shared concerns regarding the value of the hedge provided.

Supporters considered that a \$600/MWh strike preserved merchant revenues and in turn reduced premiums, as well as provided headroom above their Short Run Marginal Cost. Stakeholders also noted that a higher cap reduced the operating hours required to defend the cap.

Buyers argued that the \$600 strike leaves a substantial band of price exposure unmanaged. Buyers exposed to prices between \$300/MWh and \$600/MWh would receive no payment, despite potentially incurring material wholesale costs. A major concern was that a \$600/MWh cap may principally protect against brief and extreme price spikes rather than sustained periods of system stress.

Some respondents also noted that aligning the strike with the Administered Pricing Cap may reduce the value provided by providers able to sustain delivery over 8 hours and recommended retaining or introducing an additional \$300/MWh variant. Broader questions were raised regarding the suitability of a single strike price across different firming technologies.

Some respondents highlighted that different technologies may face different cost structures, operating characteristics and revenue requirements. Demand response providers indicated that a duration limited cap may be required to enable their participation.

LD Energy “A \$300 cap therefore asks the seller to write insurance against prices near its own cost of running... If the intent is to support new entry, the contract term on offer matters as much as the strike level.

LD&S Council “A \$600 cap would mainly provide protection against very high, short-term price spikes. A lower cap, such as \$300, would provide protection across a wider range of high-price periods.”

Enel X “A cap contract paying against the first defined number of hours above the strike price... would more closely align risk exposure with the operational capabilities of demand response resources.”

Common Contract Features

Overview: Stakeholders were generally supportive of weekly financial contract settlement. Stakeholders raised significant bankability concerns regarding force majeure risks in long term derivative contracts and emphasised the need for an appropriate mechanism to manage these.

Weekly settlement

Feedback on the proposed weekly settlement approach was generally supportive. The alignment of contract settlement with the AEMO settlement calendar was widely viewed as practical and consistent with existing market processes. The approach was seen as helping to manage counterparty exposure, limit the build-up of settlement liabilities and align contract cashflows with underlying market revenues.

At the same time, questions were raised about whether longer settlement periods could provide benefits in some circumstances. Several respondents (particularly buyers) suggested

Clean Energy Council “Aligning derivative settlement with the physical settlement cycle reduces working capital requirements.”

that monthly, quarterly or other settlement arrangements may reduce administrative burden, smooth short-term cashflow volatility and lower transaction costs. This was particularly highlighted by some large energy users and project proponents.

Force majeure

Stakeholder feedback on force majeure risk management reinforced its importance to the bankability and investability of the proposed contract suite. A recurring theme was that sellers may remain exposed to significant financial obligations during events outside their control, including asset outages, network failures and other disruptions that affect individual projects while the broader reference fleet continues to perform.

Many submissions questioned whether the proposed ability for proponents to buy back their sold positions at the prevailing market price would provide sufficient protection, particularly during periods of market stress when replacement hedges may be expensive or unavailable. Concerns were raised that this approach may not provide the level of certainty required by lenders and investors when assessing project finance arrangements resulting in inefficient risk allocation.

Support was expressed for further development of mechanisms to manage force majeure risks outside the financial derivative contracts themselves. Suggested approaches included pooled insurance arrangements, centrally administered risk-sharing mechanisms, reserve funds, buy-back facilities with predefined terms, or other forms of protection administered alongside the ESEM framework. Several submissions suggested that centralised management of certain force majeure risks may be more efficient than requiring individual projects to manage them independently.

Feedback also highlighted the need to distinguish between risks that are appropriately managed by project proponents and risks that are systemic, correlated or outside the reasonable control of asset owners. Several respondents noted that ordinary operational and performance risks should remain with sellers, while force majeure arrangements should focus on exceptional events that could materially affect project viability.

While support for additional force majeure protections was widespread, some respondents considered that force majeure risk should remain with project proponents and be managed through existing commercial mechanisms such as insurance, reserves or contracting arrangements. These submissions argued that transferring force majeure risk elsewhere could reduce transparency and weaken market incentives.

BlueScope Steel *"It is not preferable for large C&I users such as BlueScope, as weekly settlements do not align with standard financial periods"*

Clean Energy Investor Group *"Without adequate FM risk management... the bulk energy contracts will not be bankable for project-financed assets."*

Hydrostor *"If the standard contracts do not include physical force majeure relief, the broader framework should establish pooled or external protection for narrowly defined events outside reasonable project control. Ordinary operating, maintenance, and performance risk should remain with the seller."*

AFMA *"It is critical to the financial market that the derivative contracts resold by the Financial Management Entity do not contain physical force majeure provisions."*

Squadron Energy *"FM protection outside all fungible contracts is a pre-condition of bankability."*

Overarching Feedback

Overview: Stakeholders generally indicated that the structures could achieve good alignment to the Terms of Reference, subject to resolution of some concerns, including: bankability (force majeure being the largest concern); operationalisation (of the shaping product); and further demonstration of the how the products could be used by customers to manage financial risks.

Assessment of Contract Structures against ToR and Evaluation Criteria

Feedback on the proposed contract suite was generally supportive, with many respondents considering the overall architecture a positive step towards creating a standardised, fungible set of products for bulk energy, shaping and firming services. The proposed contract structures were widely recognised as an improvement on earlier concepts and several submissions noted their potential to support investment, improve liquidity and provide a foundation for future market development.

Views diverged regarding how effectively the current designs balance risks and value between market participants. While some respondents considered the proposed products to perform well against the evaluation criteria, others argued that further work is needed to demonstrate buyer value, efficient risk allocation, long-term adaptability and the potential operation of a future secondary market.

Contract recycling and the MMO

Feedback on the potential application of a future Market Making Obligation was mixed. Some participants considered the proposed contract structures to be broadly compatible with market making objectives, particularly where products are standardised, transparent and supported by sufficient trading liquidity. The proposed fungible design was viewed as a positive step towards enabling secondary market participation and facilitating future trading activity.

A recurring theme in the feedback was that the success of any future MMO will depend on the availability of underlying liquidity. Participants noted that market making obligations may encourage quoting activity but cannot, by themselves, create genuine buyer and seller demand. Several submissions emphasised that confidence in the contract design, transparent pricing mechanisms and active participation from a broad range of market participants will be necessary to support a functioning secondary market.

Questions were raised regarding the complexity and valuation of some products, particularly the Dynamic Time of Day Block Spread Swap and the Regional Reference PPA. Feedback suggested that contract features such as dynamic shaping periods, evolving reference fleets and novel pricing mechanisms may make some products more difficult to value, hedge or trade than more established market instruments. A number of submissions suggested that additional testing and market development may be required before mandatory market making obligations are introduced.

Use of the contract structures to manage risk

Feedback on the proposed contract suite generally acknowledged that the products could play a valuable role in supporting buyer risk management when used in conjunction with existing market products. Many submissions noted that the bulk energy, shaping and firming products provide exposure to different aspects of wholesale market risk and have the

BlueScope Steel “The contract structures appear broadly consistent with the Working Group’s Terms of Reference and provide a credible basis for standardised products across bulk energy, shaping and firming.”

Potentia Energy “Overall the proposed contract structure achieve the WG’s Terms of Reference. Bankability criteria should be more carefully examined.”

EUAA “... liquidity, transparent pricing and tight spreads are essential for ensuring that the benefits of the ESEM flow through to end users. Contract designs must remain simple enough to support robust secondary market activity. Overly complex shaping or index mechanisms may undermine this objective.”

Hydrostor “The proposed shaping product could support future market making if the nomination algorithm, settlement data, and fallback arrangements are sufficiently transparent.”

Engie ANZ “The proposed contracts could form part of an effective buyer hedging portfolio, but they will not provide complete risk coverage in isolation.”

potential to complement existing hedging instruments such as flat swaps, peak products and caps.

A recurring theme in the feedback was that the effectiveness of the contract suite should be assessed as an integrated package rather than as individual products in isolation. Participants noted that the bulk energy, shaping and firming products are designed to address different risk exposures, and that their value to buyers will depend on how effectively they can be combined with each other and with existing risk management tools.

Feedback also highlighted the importance of liquidity, pricing and secondary market development. Participants noted that buyer demand is likely to depend on whether the products provide a cost-effective and practical means of managing risk relative to existing alternatives. Several submissions observed that the success of the contract suite will ultimately depend on active trading, contract recycling arrangements and the emergence of a liquid secondary market.

A number of respondents identified opportunities for the products to support a broader range of participants, including large energy users, flexible loads and storage operators. Several submissions noted that allowing participants to combine products in different ways could improve flexibility and support a wider range of risk management strategies.

BlueScope Steel “The proposed products have the potential complement flat swaps, peak products and conventional caps as part of a diversified risk-management portfolio.”

Atmos Renewables “Together, the RRPPA, the Dynamic ToD Block Spread Swap and the \$600 cap should give buyers diversified bulk energy exposure, reduced single-asset volume and curtailment risk, a hedge against intra-day volatility, and protection against high-price events.”

Next Steps

The WG will consider the feedback received in preparing their Final Report and recommended contract structures. The Workshop 4 minutes (published 15/10 and linked below) contain a summary of the WG’s consideration of some of the key issues raised during consultation.

Further consultation is intended to continue following the Final Report and during the development of long form agreements.

	Oct				Nov				Dec				
W/C	5/10	12/10	19/10	26/10	2/11	9/11	16/11	23/11	30/11	7/12	14/12	21/12	
Webinar 3													Further design and long-form drafting to occur in CY27.
Workshop 5													
Prepare Final Report and Update Contract Structures													
Webinar 4 (TBC)													
Government decision making and planning													

Reference Materials

- [Consultation paper](#)
- [Draft product sheets](#)
- [Workshop 4 minutes \(Meeting 6\)](#)
- [Industry submissions](#)

Important Notice

Disclaimer

This document does not constitute legal or business advice and should not be relied on as a substitute for obtaining detailed advice about the National Electricity Law, the National Electricity Rules, or any other applicable laws, regulations, procedures or policies.

ASL has made every effort to ensure the quality of the information in this document but cannot guarantee the completeness, accuracy, adequacy or currency of that information. Accordingly, to the maximum extent permitted by law, ASL and its officers, employees and consultants involved in the preparation of this document:

- make no representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the currency, accuracy, reliability or completeness of the information in this document; and
- are not liable (whether by reason of negligence or otherwise) for any statements or representations in this document, or any omissions from it, or for any use or reliance on the information in it.

This document includes references to draft, high-level commercial terms contained in draft product sheets prepared by ASL. These terms will be subject to further review and consultation and may be subsequently updated or amended.

Copyright

© 2026 AusEnergy Services Limited

